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Abstract: A discriminatory tariff can be welfare superior to free trade in the presence of 
regional economies of scale. This is because a tariff on non-regional trade concentrates 
trade within a region, lowering the cost of transportation, so that the gains from 
economies of scale can theoretically offset the losses from the tariff. To complement the 
theoretical point I estimate the relation between transportation cost and regional volume 
of trade. The estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the volume of trade brings about 
2.5% reduction in transportation cost in the long run. 
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The importance of increasing returns to scale in shipping has long been a focus of 
transportation economics.  Trade models have begun to focus more intently on the 
inclusion of frictions, yet they typically ignore scale effects.  This paper studies one 
channel through which increasing returns in the transportation industry affect predictions 
of trade theory. Particularly, concentration of trade flows as a result of a trade policy can 
cause welfare gains from lower transportation costs. In fact, introducing a preferential 
tariff may lead to welfare outcomes that are preferred to worldwide free trade.
1 The 
estimates provided in the empirical section suggest that, holding other things constant, a 
10% increase in the regional volume of shipping reduces transportation cost by about 
2.5% in the long run and by about 0.6% in the short run. These estimates are valuable for 
welfare assessment of trade facilitating practices because regional economies of scale 
highlight an important connection between volumes of trade and transportation. This 
point is relevant for the policy debate since transport facilitation is an integral part of 
trade facilitation efforts in the post Doha negotiations.   
The discussion here is closely related to the literature on the welfare consequences 
of regionalization,
2 which re-entered the academic agenda after the recent wave of 
preferential trade agreements registered under the WTO. The main contribution of this 
paper to the literature lies in pointing out the importance of the endogenous response of 
transportation cost to the changes in trade volumes. This emphasis is motivated by 
illustrating how economies of scale can change welfare rankings of different world 
                                                 
1 Previous work includes: Cukrowski and Fisher (2000), who showed how scale economies in transport can 
reverse Ricardian predictions even if the countries are otherwise identical; and Casas and Choi (1990), who 
showed that variable returns have implications for economic growth. 
2 The extensive literature on preferential trade agreements is summarized in Bhagwati and Panagariya 
(1996) 
  1arrangements and by providing economically significant estimates of regional economies 
of scale in transportation.   
Recent research on regionalization draws attention to the significance of 
transportation costs for welfare consequences of preferential trade agreements. 
Spilimbergo and Stein’s (1998) framework often serves as a useful starting point to 
account for the cost of transportation.  In their model, trade is generated by different 
endowments, love for variety, and increasing returns in production. Using this framework 
Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1998) show how transportation costs figure in welfare rankings 
of preferential trade agreements.  The paper most closely related to the present discussion 
is Carrere (2005), who introduces a variety of internal scale economies exploited by 
monopoly shippers into a setup similar to Spilimbergo and Stein’s. This paper 
complements Carrere’s contribution by deriving welfare results analytically and 
providing economically meaningful estimates of regional economies of scale. Analytical 
tractability is achieved by the choice of utility function and assumption of external 
economies of scale. This assumption provides an additional benefit for the empirical 
implementation. External economies flexibly encompass a range of technology and 
competition related conditions in the transportation industry. The flexibility is empirically 
relevant because extremely few routes are served by a single shipper and the exact nature 
of competition is often unknown. 
This paper differs from prior literature in two ways.  First, the implicit assumption 
in the regional trade literature is that eliminating tariffs on partners would yield an even 
better outcome.  This paper asks a stronger question.  Can free trade equilibrium be 
improved by increasing a tariff on the countries outside the preferential trade area?  
  2Second, the model assumes away a production response in order to isolate the 
consumption welfare effects.  This situation is particularly favorable to free trade because 
the consumption effect from a tariff is always negative.  In the most general sense, when 
consumers make unrestricted choices, i.e. without the tariff distortion, they are able to 
achieve a higher utility.  In addition, a model with Cobb-Douglas utility and Armington-
differentiated goods, as in Armington (1969), creates a further bias in favor of worldwide 
free trade as noted by Deardorff and Stern (1994).  Specifically, it is the assumptions of 
the uniqueness of each country’s good and perfectly inelastic supply that lead to 
maximum welfare loss from the tariff. Allowing for the possibility that a country from 
the same bloc can produce a substitute to the goods from outside will lower welfare 
losses from creating the blocs. 
In the model, countries can either trade freely or be arranged into symmetric 
regional trading blocs by raising tariff on outsiders.  This preferential tariff raises the 
relative price of trade with countries outside the bloc, and concentrates trade flows within 
the region. Two competing effects arise. First, lowering trade with countries outside the 
bloc leads to a welfare loss because the tariff distorts prices forcing the consumers to buy 
inefficiently greater quantities of regional goods.  Second, concentrating trade within the 
bloc may trigger the use of better shipping technology, thus lowering costs and improving 
welfare.  For some parameter values, the second effect can dominate.  That is, if regional 
economies of scale in transport are strong enough, then it is possible to improve world 
welfare relative to free trade by forming preferential trading blocs.  In this model, free 
trade can be problematic because trade is spread too thinly among all partners and the 
improved shipping technology is never adopted.  The central assumption that drives this 
  3result is that transportation costs exhibit regional external economies of scale.  Because 
the economies of scale are external, a tariff is a way to coordinate price taking consumers 
and producers into concentrating trade and exploiting those economies.  Since the 
economies are regional in scope, no country can unilaterally internalize them. 
The empirical section of this paper assesses the economic importance of regional 
economies of scale in transportation.  The central issue in the estimation of the effect of 
trade volumes on freight rates is that causality also runs in the opposite direction: trade 
costs impede trade.  This is universally supported by the literature on gravity equations, 
which suggests that country size variables along with trade costs are important 
determinants of cross-country variation in trade volumes.  Based on this insight I use 
GDP and population to control for variation in quantities of trade that is not due to trade 
frictions.  The data for this exercise combine information on routes with detailed data on 
freight rates and trade volumes.  The results of the estimation point to the existence of 
economies of scale at the regional level.  Moreover, comparison of their estimated 
magnitudes to the theoretical model suggests that the regional economies are strong 
enough to potentially cause welfare improvement. 
 
2. Sources of regional economies of scale in transportation 
The empirical relevance of the model turns on whether there exist regional scale 
economies in shipping, and whether they are sufficiently large.  Hummels and Skiba 
(2004) suggest several sources of transportation cost savings associated with increased 
trade volumes. First, containerization of cargo offers tremendous savings on shipping and 
handling costs.  However, containers are used to different extents on trade routes across 
  4the world, with the busiest trading routes having the highest levels of containerization.  
Increased containerization occurs on routes with larger volumes because switching to 
extensive use of containers on a route requires a fixed cost to adjust or build 
infrastructure.  Therefore, containerization is feasible only when the volumes of trade are 
sufficiently large.  Second, significant cost savings can be achieved by using ships that 
are specialized or of larger capacity.  Large ships significantly lower the unit cost of 
shipping, but because of the size, their use is not feasible on low volume routes where 
they are replaced by smaller regional feeder-ships.  Both sources of economies require an 
incremental investment and are more likely to be used for large shipping volumes.
3 
Third, transit time is reduced when trade rises
4.  A shipper can expedite delivery in a 
number of ways.  It can increase the frequency of voyages, reduce the number of port 
calls, and/or use routes that are more direct.  All of these measures require significant 
upfront lump-sum investments and therefore are economically justified only for hig
throughput v
h 
olumes.    
                                                
All of the above mentioned sources of economies inevitably have regional 
spillover effects.  First, the capacity of modern liners is large relative to the trade volumes 
in a given period.  Thus, one country may not be able to use large ships up to their 
efficient capacity, but a number of countries in a region may provide sufficient volumes 
to justify the use of better ships.  Second, when two countries establish a major trading 
route, the countries along the routes as well as neighboring countries will have access to 
more efficient modes of transportation.  In other words, had Cote-d’Ivoire been closer to 
a large port, say, Rotterdam, the freight rates to the US would have been lower despite 
 
3 Stopford (2002) provides calculations of per unit freight cost for ships of different sizes. 
4 See Hummels (2001) for the discussion of cost associated with the duration of the shipping and for an 
estimation of the implicit ad valorem equivalent of the cost of time 
  5greater distance from Rotterdam to the US.  Third, the configuration of transportation 
networks reflects geographic concentration of trade volumes.  A set of countries is more 
likely to host a hub or to become a part of a trunk route if their aggregate volume of trade 
is large.  Mori and Nishikimi (2002) explicitly model endogenous formation of transport 
networks to take advantage of scale efficiencies.  
 
 
3.  The Model 
The particular choice of trade model is motivated by the question in hand. Firstly, 
the model needs to generate trade flows that can be used to investigate the interaction 
between volume of trade and per unit transportation cost. Moreover, given that the 
question implies a possibility of improvement over free trade, the model is particularly 
favorable to worldwide unrestricted trade. Among models that generate volumes of trade 
with trade frictions, I choose a combination of Armington differentiation and Cobb-
Douglas preferences over a more general CES (constant elasticity of substitution) 
functional form because Cobb-Douglas offers a distinct analytical advantage. CES allows 
the expenditure shares to vary with delivered prices and thus trade barriers, while Cobb-
Douglas keeps the shares constant.  This invariance of expenditure shares enables the 
analytical solution.   
The world consists of   countries indexed with subscript i:  N ,1 . . ii N ∈ = N , 
where N is the set of all countries. Every country i belongs to a region  .  Country i’s 
region   is a subset of all countries,  , that contains country i,  . Each of 
i R
i R i ⊂ RN i i∈R i L  
  6co ntries  nsumers in country i maximizes utility from consuming goods k coming from cou
j: 
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where   is income. The expenditure share allocated to goods from country j is equal to 












. The set of goods 
produced in country j is denoted by  j K .  In country i, the price of good k from country j 
is  , the quantity is  . Every good is produced from the inelastically supplied labor 
by price taking producers, and every consumer owns the amount of labor required to 
produce one unit of the good.  
ijk p ijk q
Trade can be impeded by transportation cost and a tariff.  In both cases a part of 
the delivered good is used in transaction.  In the case of transportation cost, a part of the 
delivered good “melts” under way.  In the case of tariff, the amount of tariff is collected 
as percentage of the transaction value and returned to the consumers as a lump sum.  The 
delivered price can be expressed as a function of domestic, or f.o.b.,
5 price of the good k 
in country j,  jk p , ad valorem equivalent of transportation cost between countries i and j, 
1 ij φ > , and ad valorem tariff on goods from country j,  1 ij τ > : 
  ijk jk ij ij pp φ τ =  (3) 
                                                 
5 “free on board”, an INCOTERMS term commonly used to distinguish the origin price from the delivered 
price, often denoted as c.i.f., “cost insurance freight”. 
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 is the import price index for goods produced in  j.  
The income in country i consists of labor income and lump sum tariff transfer. If 
country i imposes a uniform tariff,  1 i τ > , on the goods from countries that do not belong 
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 and V is the bilateral f.o.b. volume of trade. 
Similarly to the gravity equation the bilateral volume of trade depends on the incomes, 
prices, and trade barriers.  However, Cobb-Douglas demand and product differentiation 
by exporter imply constant elasticity of substitution between exporters and therefore the 
price index is specific to a country pair ij rather than to an importer i. 
 
6 We count trade only in one direction because trade is balanced. 
  8Summing up bilateral volumes with exception of domestic purchases yields 
regional volume of trade,  :   , Ri V
   (7)  ,
ii









It is illustrative to rewrite the regional volume as a weighted sum of exporters’ total 













− ⎟  (8) 
where   is country l's volume of trade. The weighting term in brackets reflects country 
l’s participation in the trade of the i’s region. For example, if country l does not trade 
with any other country j from i’s region  , 
l V
i R 0  lj i Vj = ∀∈ R , then the weight is zero. 

















− ⎟ ⎟  (9) 
so that the regional volume of trade is a function of the weighted sum of the regional 
incomes. As in the case of volumes, the weight reflects country l’s participation in 
country i’s regional trade. Based on this insight I later construct the measures of regional 
income and regional volume of trade. 
Endogenous transportation is the key point of this paper. The traditional iceberg 
assumption is relaxed to allow transportation within a region to exhibit external 
economies of scale. The final good is still consumed during the delivery but the amount 
used up depends on the quantity shipped. While consumers respond to shifts in delivered 
  9price given by  ijk φ , the shippers are motivated by revenues from delivering a unit of the 
good, denoted by  ijk f .  The two are obviously connected as  ( )/ ijk jk ijk jk pfp φ =+ . In the 
most general case, transportation cost depends on a vector of cost parameters, , such 
as distance, weight-to-value ratio, stowage, special handling requirements, and on the 
vector of trade volumes,  :    
ijk X
ijk V
  ( ) , ijk ijk ijk ff = XV (10) 
In the empirical specification, I control for a variety of the cost and volume components 
but for now consider a parsimonious version of equation (10) sufficient for the theoretical 
experiment. Mori and Nishikimi (2002) propose a useful model to relate bilateral unitary 
transportation cost,  ij f , to the aggregate quantity of shipping in the country i’s region, 






     if   
,      ,
   if   
ji j R i
ij ij R i i ij
jR i
Ri
F pdc Q c
fdQ j dF F pQ c Q
⎧ <
⎪ ⎪ = ⎨
≥ ⎪
⎪ ⎩
R ∀ ∈  (11) 
where c and F are cost parameters expressed in units of delivered good. The parameter F 
can be thought of as a fixed cost investment that lowers the variable cost by c. Figure 1 
shows the cost profile.  Economies of scale become effective after regional quantity 
surpasses the scale threshold F
c . For countries outside i's region transportation cost is 
the value of the “melted” goods:  
()  ,   ij ij j ij i fd p d c j =∀ R ∉ . 
  10() , ij ij R f dQ  
p
 
On top of its analytical simplicity this model of transportation costs avoids an 
additional equilibrium where regional trade is zero and transportation cost is infinite.  
Laussel and Riezman (2006) consider such an equilibrium in a model with fixed cost of 
transportation.   
Next I investigate welfare changes from regional concentration of trade achieved 
by a discriminatory non-regional tariff.  The following set of symmetry assumptions 
significantly simplifies the analysis. All countries are equidistant,     , ij ddi j = ∀ .  Each 
country produces the same number of goods, K. In the symmetric case there is no reason 
for the wages to differ and the trade is automatically balanced.  For convenience I 
normalize wages to unity:  1   i wi =∀ ∈ N , which fixes prices at  1   , jk pj k = ∀ . With 
prices fixed at unity the volumes of trade equal quantities of trade. The world consists of 
R regions,  1 R ≥ , each region consists of 
N
R
 countries, each country belongs to exactly 
R Q   F
c
ji j dc  
  0 
Figure 1. Unitary transportation cost with regional external economies of scale 
  11one region:  .  Symmetry further implies that 
 and 
,      ii
ii
i =∅ = ∀ ∈ ∩∪ RR N   N
1  i Ni β
− =∀ ∈ N
1
R R β
− = .  The indices i, ij, and ijk are no longer necessary. 
Applying symmetry assumptions to the equation (9) yields regional quantity as a 
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⎛⎞ =− ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ −−
 (12) 
where  R φ denotes the ad valorem equivalent of regional transportation cost. Under the 
symmetry assumptions and using demands from equation (4), the indirect utility of 
consumers as a function of tariff is given by:  
  () () () (
11 1 1
ln ln ln 1 1 ln , 1 ln RR N UL d Q
RR R
τ ) R θ τφ τ
τ
⎛− ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ =−− − − − − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
τ φ  (13) 
where 1 NR dc φ =+  is the ad valorem equivalent of non-regional transportation cost.   
Proposition 1.  A non-regional tariff τ
∗ can improve welfare level over free trade only if 
there exists a non-regional tariff τ  such that the regional quantity  ( ) R Q τ  exceeds the 
scale threshold F
c , or more formally:  ( ) () () 1: ii R F UU Q c ττ τ
∗ >⇒ ∃ > . 
Proof. The welfare effect of tariff can be evaluated by differentiating indirect utility in 
(13) with respect to tariff: 
 
ln ln ln 1


















The first term on the r.h.s above is non-positive, so the whole expression has a chance of 
being positive only if the second term is positive. The second term consists of the scale 







, and the elasticity of concentration of trade on the regional route.  The 
elasticity of concentration can be shown to be always positive by differentiating the 
regional quantity of trade with respect to tariff. 
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, is zero if economies of scale are not 
effective and can be negative for some values of τ  if and only if the threshold value of 
economies of scale, F
c , is smaller than the maximum quantity that can be concentrated 
on the regional trade routes,  lim R
F
Q
c τ→∞ <  . It implies that  () : R F Q c ττ ∃> . Q.E.D. 
  Proposition 1 simply states that economies of scale are a necessary condition for 
welfare improvement by a discriminatory tariff. That is, a non-regional tariff cannot 
improve welfare unless it induces regional economies of scale. According to Proposition 
2 such improvement is also always possible. 
Proposition 2. For any values of parameters R, N, L, and d there exists an x such that for 
every threshold smaller than x there exists a non-regional tariff τ  such that utility level 
  13() U τ  exceeds the free trade level of utility, or more formally: 
() () ,, ,    :   : 1
F
RNLd x x U U
c
ττ ∀∃ ∀ < ∃ > . 







⎛⎞ =− ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ c
, so that the economies of scale are effective at any quantity above 













.  Consider increasing tariffs starting from a 


















   Proposition 2 states that for any values of parameters, regional economies of scale 
can make a preferential tariff preferred to no tariff. This possibility is shown by 
constructing an example such that economies of scale are immediately effective as soon 
as any concentration occurs. The existence result suggests that, while theoretically 
possible, it remains an empirical question whether economies of scale are sufficiently 
strong to affect regional welfare.  
  The intuition behind the propositions is developed by examining the iso-utility 
curve in the ( , R ) f t  space shown in Figure 2. Every combination of the trade costs on this 
curve results ceteris paribus in free trade utility level. Any combination of trade costs 
below the iso-utility line corresponds to a higher utility level. Compare the iso-utility 
curve to the technical feasibility line where the transportation cost and tariff are linked 
through the changes in the regional trade volume induced by the tariff. Welfare 
improvement is possible as long as there are technologically feasible combinations of 
  14tariffs and transportation costs below the iso-utility curve. The shaded area below the iso-
utility curve and above the line of technological feasibility represents the welfare 
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(Parameter values:  1.21, 10, 1.1, 3, 12. R FL R N φ = === = ) 
<<<Insert Figure 2 here>>> 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 becomes clear by noting that the technological 
feasibility line has a negative slope only when the regional economies of scale are 
effective.  The proof of existence of the welfare improving tariff in Proposition 2 assumes 
that the economies of scale are effective immediately starting from the free trade level of 
trade. Graphically it would correspond to a situation when the technological feasibility 
line starts sloping down from zero tariff. 
  Before turning to the estimation it is useful to simulate a theoretical benchmark of 
scale elasticity which would make a discriminatory tariff on non-regional trade welfare 
  15improving. For a grid of tariff values (from 0 to 5%) I generate regional volumes of trade 
and corresponding maximum transportation cost that would keep the welfare at the pre-
tariff level. Then I estimate the regional scale elasticity by fitting a flexible functional 
form relation between logarithms of freight rates and logarithms of calculated regional 
volumes.  
Keeping only those terms in equation (13) that are affected by the tariff, I set 
1 τ =  to calculate free trade level of indirect utility, and then express the tradeoff between 
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For every combination of R f and τ  regional quantity  is calculated using equation  R Q (12) 




error term contains the approximation error. The scale elasticity is then calculated as 
1 2 α α +  and plotted against the tariff that is required to induce the simulated regional 
volumes. Figure 3 reports the relation between a tariff and the regional scale elasticity 
required to offset such discriminatory tariff. The relation in Figure 3 is negative because 
stronger economies of scale are required to offset larger tariffs. So, concentration of trade 
from a 1% non-regional tariff can improve welfare if regional scale elasticity is stronger 
than about -0.1. This back-of-the-envelope procedure is designed to serve as a benchmark 
for the empirically obtained magnitudes.  
                                                 
7 The R-squared of this regression is very close to 1. 
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4.  Estimation of regional scale economies 
 
This section examines the effect of trade volumes on freight rates.  The key to this 
exercise is the proper treatment of the endogeneity of freight rates and trade volumes.  
While I am interested in the effect of trade volumes on the level of shipping cost, the 
inverse effect is present under rather general conditions.  Lower trade costs encourage 
greater trade.  I use tariff and country size variation to trace out exogenous variation in 
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Figure 3. Benchmark strength of regional scale economies. 
  17The emphasis on regional trade volumes requires that, along with traditional cost 
shifters, I appropriately condition on the other relevant trade volumes: bilateral volume of 
trade,  , and bilateral quantity of trade in a given commodity,  . These volumes of 
trade are instrumented by an exporter’s GDP and population, an importer’s GDP and 
population, regional GDP and population, and tariffs. The instruments capture theoretical 
determinants of volumes given in equation 
ij V ijk q
(4) for bilateral quantity of a given 
commodity, in equation (6) for total bilateral volume of trade, and in equation (9) for 
regional volume of trade. 
Special care is devoted to constructing regional volumes of trade.  Some obvious 
groupings into regions, say by continents, are problematic because in reality every 
country often belongs to multiple trading regions.  United States’s imports from France 
are a part of Europe - North America Atlantic route while imports from China are a part 
of the Asia - North America Pacific trade route.  The relevant regional volumes of trade 
are different despite the same destination. The variable for regional volumes is 
constructed to capture actual shipping routes. A country l may frequently but not always 
occur on the same itinerary with the exporter j in question.  Accordingly, I weight the 
country l’s exports to the importer by the frequency with which vessels visiting exporter j 
also visit exporter l.  The weighted volumes are then summed over all exporters other 
than j.  
The regional GDP and population are constructed using a similar weighting 
scheme to capture the idea of equations (8) and (9) with the data on the actual shipping 
routes
8. The data on volumes of trade come from NBER UN data set, see Feenstra et al 
                                                 
8 vessel itineraries taken from www.shipguide.com 
  18(2005) for a detailed description. GDP’s and populations are taken from PENN world 
tables. The volumes of trade are excluded from the subsequent aggregates. The bilateral 
volume of a commodity   is excluded from the total bilateral volume  , and the total 
bilateral volume is not included in the regional volume  . Data appendix contains 
additional detail on the data and provides summary statistics in Tables A1 and A2. 
ijk V ij V
, Ri V
 
Long run estimates 
Product level import data from five Latin American importers (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and the US in 1994 are used to estimate long run regional 
scale elasticities. The data are recorded at 6 digit Harmonized System (HS) commodity 
level and include all exporters worldwide. Each observation contains value, weight, 
transportation charge, and duty paid.  Freight  ijk f  is calculated as the total shipping 
charge divided by total weight of the shipment. Price   is calculated as total value of 
shipment divided by shipment’s weight.  Tariff is calculated in ad valorem terms. 
Distance   is measured as the greater circle distance between the capitals. 
ijk p
ij d
Assume customary log-linear form of the freight rate function in equation (10)  
  12 34 5 , ln ln ln ln ln ln ijk k ijk ij ijk ij R i ijk fp d V V V α ββ ββ β =+ + + + + + ε  (15) 
Column (2) of Table 1 presents results of IV estimation. The estimated long run 
elasticity of freight rates with respect to trade volumes is -.26, implying that a 10% larger 
regional volumes of trade correspond to 2.6% lower unitary transportation cost. Column 
(3) reports IV estimates of equation (15) with a set of importer dummies. This 
specification is a useful robustness check because the US is substantially different from 
  19the rest of the importers. However, controlling for importer effect does not substantially 
affect the estimates perhaps reflecting the global nature of the shipping industry. 
According to the Hausman test, the OLS estimates in column (1) are systematically 
different from the IV estimates.    
The coefficients on total bilateral volume and volume by commodity in 
specifications (2) and (3) are consistent with the idea of lumpy investments in 
transportation technology.  In order to see this, start by noting that the positive effect of 
bilateral trade volume on freight rate does not necessarily imply that there are 
diseconomies of scale at bilateral level. A 10% increase in volume of trade of each 
commodity for a given country pair increases the aggregate bilateral volume also by 10%. 
The resulting effect on shipping rates is still negative and is given by ( ) 34 β β + , -0.73 + 
0.49 = -0.24, or a 2.4% reduction in unitary transport cost. Furthermore, a positive  4 β   
implies that a commodity that is traded in lower volumes than the rest of the commodities 
for a given country pair incurs a relatively higher transportation charge. This can be seen 
by considering consider a 10% increase in the volume of trade of all commodities traded 
between two countries except one commodity k. The average level of transportation cost 
is likely to decrease (as long as k is a small share of bilateral volume) but the freight rate 
of k will increase because bilateral volume increases. This is consistent with the idea that 
once a technology suitable for high volumes is used, shipping smaller volumes becomes 
more costly. 
 
Short run estimates 
  20Due to the time dimension and greater product detail of the US imports data it is 
possible to control for a variety of exporter specific and commodity specific 
characteristics and estimate short run response to changes in regional volumes. The US 
imports data for 1991-2000 contain the same variables as the Latin American data and are 
recorded at 10 digit level of HS classification. The estimating equation is 
  12 34 5 , ln ln ln ln ln ln jkt jk jkt j jkt jt R jt jkt fp d V V V α ββ ββ β =+ + + + + + ε  (16) 
  The results of IV estimation are in column (5) of Table 1. The estimated 
magnitude suggests that a 10% increase in regional volume of trade brings about 0.56% 
decrease in freight rates. The estimated scale elasticity is smaller than the long run 
elasticity consistent with the idea that in the long run the transportation industry can 
better exploit differences in regional volumes of trade. The OLS fixed effect estimates in 
column (4) are systematically different from the IV estimates according to the Hausman 
test. 
 
Economic significance of the estimates 
Expressing the estimated magnitudes of scale economies in equivalent distance 
savings provides a useful way to appreciate the economic significance of the estimates. 
For example, Peru and Morocco are two similar countries that are similarly removed 
from the US but have vastly different regional volumes of trade. In 1997 their GDP’s and 
total volumes of trade were within 5% of each other’s, and the distance to the US ports is 
about the same. The port of Callao, Peru, is about 3900 nautical miles from San 
Francisco, while Gibraltar is about 3200 nautical miles to New York. Morocco however 
lies on a large number of European trading routes going through Gibraltar. Not 
  21surprisingly, the calculated regional volume of trade is 3.7 times higher for Morocco.  
According to the estimates, this difference in regional volumes of trade can lead to 3.7
.25 
≈1.4 times lower shipping rates. In order to achieve such a saving the distance would 
have to be reduced 1.4
1/.345≈2.6 fold.  In other words, as a part of a major trading route 
Moroccan exporter have to pay 1.4 times less to ship their goods to the US which is 
equivalent to 2.6 times shorter distance. 
The estimated magnitudes are generally commensurate with the previous findings. 
Mori and Nishikimi (2002) survey results from a number of scattered studies that have 
looked at the relation between trade quantities and freight rates.  Some estimates are 
similar to the ones obtained in this paper for a set of Latin American countries and the 
US.  For example, a 10% increase in the number of ships on a particular route between 
Japan and each of the Southeast Asian ports results in a 1.2% reduction in the freight 
rates. Table 1 reports similar magnitudes in specifications that do not take into account 
endogeneity of trade volumes. 
The estimated magnitudes are sufficiently strong to for a discriminatory tariff to 
be welfare improving. The theoretical benchmarks in Figure 3 suggest that the estimated 
scale elasticity of -.26 is sufficiently strong to offset a small discriminatory tariff on the 
order of 2%.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
Regional scale economies in transportation create a welfare gain when a policy 
leads to concentration of trade flows within a region.  These economies can theoretically 
offset losses from policy distortions. The estimated magnitudes of scale elasticity 
  22compare favorably with the benchmark values generated by the model. The positive 
implication of this paper is that the effect of regional tariff preference on trade can be 
reinforced by regional economies of scale. Regional transportation costs decline 
endogenously in response to concentration of trade flows, thus further promoting trade. 
The data support this interdependence.  Holding other things constant transportation is 
cheaper on the busier routes. The normative part of the analysis suggests that the regional 
preferential trade agreements create an additional welfare benefit that can make a 
regional trading arrangement welfare superior to unrestricted trade. This result arises in a 
model where transportation is modeled as a regional positive externality.   
The exact nature of the externality requires further investigation because it may 
have important policy implications.  Some technological changes are irreversible, for 
example deepening of a port to allow for larger container ships.  In this case, a tariff is 
required only as a temporary coordination measure and the concentration will persist 
even after the tariff is lifted.  On the other hand, the economies could be a result of a 
reversible process, such as use of larger ships on heavier routes.  This would mean that, 
when the tariff is lifted and the price taking consumers switch back to their pre-tariff 
behavior, the transportation industry will respond by reverting to less efficient 
technology. 
In many situations the effect of distance can be more intrusive than presently 
modeled. Larger ships tend to be used on the longer routes. This creates a potentially 
interesting interaction because economies of scale can be better exploited on the longer 
routes. 
  23Application of the estimated regional economies to the discussion on 
regionalization hinges on a proper definition of a region. Transportation economists and 
trade economists might have a different idea of what constitutes a region. For instance, 
the US and Japan are a part of the same transportation region, the North Pacific, but they 
are rarely put in the same region when discussing costs and benefits of regionalization. 
Finally, the discussion in the paper and the empirical results focus explicitly on 
transportation costs.  However, there are other reasons that unit transaction costs between 
two destinations are decreasing in the volume of trade.  Some notable examples include 
costs of: adapting products to a specific market; establishing communication 
infrastructure between two countries; and establishing a distribution network.  All of 
these can be thought of as technologies that require a fixed cost to reduce the level of 
variable cost.  Thus, use of a better technology will be justified only by increased 
volumes. 
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  26Table 1. Estimates of regional economies of scale 
Long-run estimates    Short-run estimates 
OLS IV  IV    OLS IV 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) 


















    
Commodity bilateral 




































Commodity level  
HS6 HS6 HS6    HS10 HS10 
Fixed effect 













Importer dummy  No  No  Yes      
Importers Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile, 
Paraguay, United States, 
Uruguay 
  US 
Years 1994    1991-2000 
Cragg-Donald F-
statistic 
 264.68  154.76     923.528 
R-sq 0.76        0.54  
N - observations  264,211  263,732  263,732    662,243 659,039 
Notes:  1) In the IV specifications the volumes are instrumented by ad valorem tariff (for commodity 
bilateral volume); GDP and population of importer (for total bilateral volume); and regionally weighted 
GDP and population for the regional volume. 2) US regressions are performed on seaborne shipments.  The 
Latin American data does not provide a brake down by mode of transportation. 3) First stage F statistics of 
excluded instruments in all specifications are above 4,000 4) The US sample is restricted to those HS10-
exporter categories that have at least 9 years of data. 5) Estimation of IV specifications performed using 
Baum, Schaffer, Stillman (2007) STATA module 6) Standard errors in parentheses 7) Commodity bilateral 
volume is in value terms for specifications 1,2, and 3, and in units for specifications 4 and 5. 8) In 
specifications (4) and (5) a Hausman test favors fixed effect over random effects specification. 9) All 
variables are in logs 
  27Data Appendix 
Imports and Transport Cost Data.  
 
US Census Bureau, “US Imports of Merchandise”.  These data report extremely detailed 
customs information on US imports from all exporting countries (approximately 160) for 
1991-2000.  The data are reported at the 10 digit Harmonized System level 
(approximately 15300 goods categories). The data is aggregated to the 6 digit level for 
comparability with the other trade data in the long run specifications.  Data include the 
valuation of imports, inclusive and exclusive of freight and insurance charges, shipment 
quantity (by count and by weight), transportation mode, district of entry into the US, and 
duties paid.  Goods are valued FAS, or “free alongside ship” meaning that freight charges 
include loading and unloading expenses.   
 
ALADI Secretariat, “Latin American Trade”.  Reports imports of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay from 1994 at the 6 digit Harmonized System coding 
(approximately 3000 goods).  Data include exporter, value of imports, weight, freight 
charges and insurance charges (separately).  Freight charges are based on FOB ("free on 
board" - exclusive of loading costs") valuation of goods.  For overland transport within 
the ALADI countries it appears that the freight field has a zero value.  This is because 
charges are only incurred between exit and entry ports, and these are the same for 
overland transport.  Note, however, that this does not change the relative valuation of 
freight charges across export partners.  All trade incurs some overland shipping from 
factory to exporting port and from importing port to location of consumption and these 
costs are missing from all the data.  One can then think of the observed values as a 






Bilateral tariff data at the 6 digit HS level are available for the six importers.  While the 
precise year varies somewhat across countries, most of the data are from 1994.  The data 
originally come from the  TRAINS dataset, and we employ a special extract provided by 
Jon Haveman that painstakingly constructed bilateral tariff rates using preference 




Data on ocean shipping times are derived from a master schedule of shipping for 
1999 taken from www.shipguide.com.  This shipping schedule describes all departures 
and arrivals of all commercial vessels operating worldwide in this period.  From this, we 
construct a matrix of shipping times between all ports everywhere in the world and all US 
entry ports.  Several modifications are necessary.  First, direct shipments are not available 
for every port-port combination (Tunis does not ship directly to Houston).  In these cases, 
  28I calculate all possible combinations of indirect routings (Tunis to Rotterdam to Houston; 
Tunis to Rio to Houston and so on) and take the minimum shipment time available 
through these routings.  Second, there are generally multiple ports within each origin 
country.  In this section, a within-country average of shipment time from these ports is 
employed.  Because US data include entry port detail, these are combined with 
destination-port specific arrival times.  
  29Table A1. Summary statistics of the variables in the Latin American – US data set. 
Statistic 
 Variable  Unit value 
Mean Standard  deviation 
Ad valorem freight rate    0.13  0.18 
Distance Km  9,033  4,836 
Exporter's population  million  99.9  216.7 
Exporter's GDP  $, billion  1,130  1,800 
Importer's population  million  129.8  114.1 
Importer's GDP  $, billion  3,040  3,510 
Route weighted population  million  951.8  654.2 
Route weighted GDP  $,billion  10,200  2,530 
Commodity level trade volume  $,000  2,483  73,500 
Bilateral volume of trade  $, billion  7.4  21.0 
Route weighted volume of trade  $, billion  4,290  1,150 
 
Table A2. Summary statistics of the variables in US data set. 
Statistic 
 Variable  Unit value 
Mean Standard  deviation 
Ad valorem freight rate    0.072  0.086 
Exporter's population  million  143.9  317.0 
Exporter's GDP  $, billion  995  1,260 
Importer's population  million  278.3  11.5 
Importer's GDP  $, trillion  8.90  1.18 
Route weighted population  million  1,016  782 
Route weighted GDP  $,trillion  6.59  2.79 
Commodity level trade volume  $,000  3,060  56,100 
Bilateral volume of trade  $, billion  15.5  25.6 
Route weighted volume of trade  $, billion  2,170  1,870 
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